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
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A
P R O S P E C T

OF THE

C O N S E Q U E N C E S

OF THE

Present Conduct of *Great Britain*

T O W A R D S

A M E R I C A.

Ogni atto di autorità di uomo a uomo che non derivi
dall'assoluta necessità è tirannico.

BECCARIA, § 2. p. 15.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ALMON; opposite Burlington-House, in
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[PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIX-PENCE.]



TO THE READER.

I HAVE seen very few of the polemical tracts on the present contest between Great Britain and America; and therefore I may very possibly have made use of arguments employed by others who have written before me on the same subject. My intention has been far from endeavouring to derive merit to myself from the works of others; nor do I arrogate the least from my own. I look upon the present contest to be highly pernicious to Great Britain; and I think moreover, that it is not founded in justice; these are my motives for delivering my sentiments to the Public; and this I do, without considering myself under the necessity of consulting whatever may have been said by others on this occasion. I considered it as a duty incumbent on every one as a good citizen, and as a lover of his country, if he had any opinions which he thought might promote the public good, to deliver them at so perilous a season as the present. In so doing

doing I acquit myself of being instrumental in promoting measures whose consequences appear to me so fatal and destructive : and though as an individual I cannot restrain the violence of this torrent which is likely to overwhelm us, I have the internal satisfaction of having contributed my share to oppose it.

It is about two months since I finished this treatise, and intended it for immediate publication ; but was restrained by diffidence. As danger increases, men grow bolder ; and I could no longer resist the ardour which pushed me forward on the patience of the Public.

There is one circumstance which it may not be improper to mention. I advance under the banner of no party or sect, political or religious ; I have as little connection with Americans or America as any man in Great Britain ; and whatever I have said has sincerely flowed from my ideas of justice, and from the love and affection which I bear to this my native Country, and to its constitution.

A

P R O S P E C T

OF THE

CONSEQUENCES, &c.

THE distress to which this Nation is likely to be reduced by the present American contest is truly alarming to every man who professes the least regard for his country. But there are those among us, as in most other States, who are not only indifferent about such an event, however fatal, but are contented to promote it so long as they receive a present temporary advantage from the measure. Vigorously to oppose, and, if possible, to defeat the designs of such men, is a duty incumbent on every good citizen; to neglect them, and their endeavours, is at this time likely to prove very fatal in its consequences;

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sequences ; and a careless supineness on our part may have the effect of promoting their views, and seems to imply a tacit consent to, if it does not absolutely make us accomplices in their actions.

In all States the presiding and governing party is small ; but yet to promote their ambition, or other sinister views, they have generally possessed artifice enough to lead the multitude into great and dangerous extravagances ; and that multitude as generally pays dearly for its weakness and folly in the conclusion. With us, this could never be the case if we would suffer ourselves to be well-informed, would we properly exert our legal rights and powers, and be honest and true to our own cause. A secret junto, an ostensible ministry, let them unite as they please, would never be able to drive us over hill and dale, rough and smooth, till they had plunged us into the destined pit, if we would but keep our eyes open, and disdain to be hood-winked to serve the purposes of ruinous ambition. *Upon my word*, * says Lord Chesterfield, who may be allowed to have been an adequate judge of such men as we are speaking of, *our species will pay dear for the quarrels and ambition of a few, and these by no means the most valuable part of it. If the many were*

wiser than they are, the few must be quieter, and would perhaps be juster and better than they are. This is precisely the case with the Nation at this time; inasmuch that one may imagine it a picture delineated by a pencil prophetic of the State of the Kingdom at the present hour. How much therefore is it the duty of the many to be wiser, not merely to ward off distress from themselves, an object this important enough! but to protect so large a body of the human species, their fellow subjects, both here and in America, set apart by the few for devoted victims to be sacrificed on this altar of their ambition? To promote these ends, the public weal demands the assistance of every individual; the obligation increases in proportion as the times are pressing; and no citizen can be exempted from contributing his share by any plea of want of consequence on the one hand, or pretences of inability on the other. Every man has abilities greater or less, of one kind or of another; every one therefore should try his own strength, for the complexion of these times requires a vigorous exertion of all.

The public are acquainted with three plans or modes of proceeding with respect to the Americans. The first, is to subdue them by force of arms. The second, to accommodate with them the disputed points, and to confirm to them their parliaments, with

the King, to be supreme legislatures in America. The third, is entirely to cast them off, to reject them. Of these three plans, the ministry have adopted that which, in my opinion, will prove highly distressful and injurious to this Kingdom.

One grand, and perhaps the principal point in dispute in our present contest with the Americans, is the article of taxation. Now I presume no man doubts that the Americans have a right to liberty in common with Englishmen. But how far that right is annihilated if they are not to have the disposal of their property like Englishmen, and if the supreme legislature of Great Britain is to enact laws for them, are subjects which merit a particular enquiry, because they stand as the foundation whereon this destructive war is the ruinous superstructure.

The Americans assert, that the parliament of Great Britain hath no right to tax them: the reason alledged is, because they are not represented in that parliament; if not represented; then they do not tax themselves; if they do not tax themselves, then they have not the disposal of their own property; if they have not the disposal of their own property, they are no longer free-men, but slaves. Ministry, and their adherents, deny this reasoning to be good, and in answer to it

it alledge, that there are * nineteen persons in twenty in Great Britain who have no vote for representatives in parliament, consequently are not represented, and yet are taxed by parliament; so that the Americans fall only under the like predicament with these persons, and ought therefore to be contented with their lot.

This hath been generally esteemed the weightiest argument of ministry, delivered by their abettors, for establishing the power of taxation in the British parliament, over America. For as to other arguments, I must confess to have neither seen, nor heard of any that deserve a serious refutation. And this which is now before us, will I think on a candid examination, prove to be no better than a child of mere artifice and sophistry. Let there be, if you will, nineteen in twenty persons who have no share in

* In conversation too we are pestered with instances of persons, who from reason and the nature of the thing, it is pretended, should have a vote for representatives in parliament, but yet have no legal right to it; and from which it is argued that the Americans, as well as these, ought to be taxed without representation. Cannot, or will not such men see, that on their own state of the matter, they are arguing from a grievance, to the extension of that grievance? Would they reason justly, the conclusion should be the reverse of what they make it; and as this is a grievance, so far from being extended, it ought to be removed.

electing representatives in parliament; yet the property of those who are not represented lies in common, and is intermixed with that of those persons who are represented; and the same act of legislature taxes alike and indiscriminately the property of him who is represented, as it doth the property of him who is not represented. For example, the tax on the land of a copyholder, which land doth not intitle him to a vote for representatives in parliament, is none other than the tax on the land of his neighbour who is a freeholder, and represented. Legislature makes no distinction between the two persons, nor their lands, although one be represented, and the other be not; one act includes both, the tax is laid alike on the property of the one and of the other, in short both share the same fate. But were legislature, on the contrary, to make a partial distinction between the persons and the property of those who are represented, and of those who are not, to the injury of the latter, the impropriety and injustice of taxation without representation would then be evident and manifest; and persuaded I am, that such taxation without representation would not long be submitted to. Now with respect to the Americans, they are separated from Great Britain by so great a distance, and the state of the country and its inhabitants so different from ours, that they cannot be included in
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the same acts of legislature with us ; distinct acts must be made for America alone ; and no part of them being represented in that legislature which taxes them, and neither their persons nor their property being intermixed with theirs who are represented, the inhabitants of America would certainly be placed in a state totally different from that of the unrepresented inhabitants of Great Britain, and who in fact are no sufferers by the privation of the right of representation. The two cases then are wholly different ; and would ministry have supported the semblance of analogy between them, it became at least incumbent on them to prove that there is some large district in Great Britain, some county, to say nothing less, the numerous inhabitants of which were in no respect represented in the parliament of Great Britain, and yet were taxed by that parliament. I say the semblance of analogy, for it would be no more ; because, could this be proved, it would not avail them unless they could likewise prove that the peculiar state in which a part of a kingdom happens to be, is that very state in which the whole ought to be ; and this would be saying that the parliament of Great Britain ought to be appointed without constituents, and without members who were representatives of the people.

But, to return to the Americans, the necessity of distinct acts of the Legislature for
America

America solely, and neither their persons nor their property being intermixed with those of their neighbours who are represented, and which would be to them as a shield and palladium against violence and oppression, are circumstances, which, together with a total privation of representation, might lay open a wide breach for every species of rapine to rush in upon them, and to exercise its fury with impunity, and without redress, should it so happen in future time, that a legislature dissimilar from the present, should divest itself of integrity, to assume in its stead corruption and avarice. There is besides another circumstance formidable in itself, and pregnant with terror to the Americans if the British Legislature is to possess the power of taxing them unrepresented; for in such case the party taxing, contrary to all rule where despotism prevails not, is itself exempt from every part of the burthen laid on. Nor is this all, the impropriety extends still further, for every tax laid on the Americans by the British Legislature, would be a proportionable diminution of their own; which are powerful motives to induce them not to be over scrupulous in the article of American taxation, unless we can suppose that self-interest, accompanied with plausible reasons at least for promoting it, is less predominant in the breasts of mankind than the experience
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of each day fatally proves it to be. It is evident therefore that the inhabitants of America unrepresented, and yet under the power of taxation by the British parliament, are not in a parallel state or condition with the unrepresented inhabitants of Great Britain; inasmuch as the latter are as secure in their property as though they were represented; and that the former for want of representation, become exposed to every species of oppression: and in worse times than ours may be reduced to the like state with the Sicilians of whom Cicero emphatically says, "That though they were the allies of the Romans, they had not the liberty left them even of lamenting their wrongs," * *Hoc jure sunt socii, utiis ne deplorare quidem de suis incommodis liceat.*

Thus falls to the ground this formidable argument of ministry; I say it is the argument of ministry, and am convinced it is the most formidable they have, because it cannot be supposed they would give their worst; and because it is an argument they publicly support, for speaking with a view to the Americans, and condemning their conduct as contrary to reason, they tell us in unlimited terms, that "To be a subject of Great Britain with all its consequences,

* Cic. in Verr.

“ is to be the freest member of any civil
 “ society in the known world.” But this
 proposition requires an explication, unless
 we mean to be contented to take mere sounds
 for substance. I will however readily agree
 to it so far as it concerns *a subject resident in*
Great Britain: and for this, we are not in-
 debted to any ministry; the sole merit of
 the blessing is due to the public virtue,
 firmness, and courage of our ancestors.
 But if the parliament of Great Britain have
 a right to make laws which are binding on
 the Americans, this assertion will not hold
 good with respect to them. I would ask,
 how it comes to pass that a subject of Great
 Britain, and there resident, is the freest
 member of any civil society? It is certainly
 because the powers of legislation and tax-
 ation are in the hands of the people: the
 people not only propound, but describe and
 enact their own laws, by their representatives
 in parliament; so that in fact they obey no
 laws but their own, or in other words they
 obey no will but their own, and this is the
 summit of political freedom; they pay no
 tax which they have not laid upon themselves,
 and they submit to no laws which they have
 not made for themselves: and therefore it
 is, that a subject of Great Britain, *and there*
resident, is the freest member of any civil
 society in the known world. But if the
 Americans are not represented in that par-
 liament

liament which enacts their laws ; and that parliament enacts separate laws for the Americans, which must necessarily be done ; laws, which the Americans have neither propounded, described nor enacted, nor have had any part or share therein, surely their situation in point of liberty and freedom is just the reverse of that of British subjects resident in Great Britain ! Under these circumstances, I see not how they can be called free subjects by others, nor arrogate freedom to themselves ; they are taxed by others without the concurrence of their own act or will ; and they make not their own laws, nor have they any share in the making of them, and these are the characteristic and criterion of freedom.

Deprived therefore of these divine rights (if from their eminence I may so call them) enjoyed by Britons, which alone constitute freedom ; and bound by laws made by others, and particularly levelled at them, they become subjected to the will of others, instead of their own ; and thus their property, liberty, and whatever beside is held dearest by mankind, is like a forlorn hope, submitted to the same will, and left entirely at the discretion and disposal of another*.

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* Freedom consists in not being subjected to the will and power of another, *Sui juris sunt omnes qui non sunt in aliena potestate*, says Cowel. And where another has the disposal of your property without your acquiescence, this

No man, I presume, will call this a state of freedom; it is such, I am convinced, as Englishmen will not be satisfied with for themselves; former struggles with the crown plainly evince it; and the troubles excited in the reign of Charles the First are a convincing proof of it. The cause of contest with that unhappy misguided Prince was evidently this, and nothing more; To secure to the People the right of making for themselves those laws by which they were to be governed, and the right of laying that taxation upon themselves which they themselves were to pay. This was the great cause undertaken against that Prince by the people; it was vigorously carried on, and as happily concluded; and without which, I may venture to affirm, there had been an end to liberty in this Kingdom. If this be so, with what justice or humanity can we wish to involve our fellow subjects in America in the like distress and difficulty, from which our ancestors nobly extricated themselves and us at the expence of some of the best blood in the nation, and even at the hazard of the constitution itself?

is being in a state of servitude, and is so described by the old lawyers Bracton, Fleta; and Cowel from them says, *Quia quandoque placuerit domino, auferre poterit villano suo uainagium suum, et omnia sua bona.* The distinction then, as far as concerns property, between a freeman and a slave is this: The freeman has the disposal of his own property; the slave, if he has any property, it is at the disposal of his lord. *Cowell's Inf. Lib. 2 Tit. 8. Sect. 2.*

If therefore, ministry will not allow that there is reason or justice in the cause which the Americans have espoused, they might have had the feelings of humanity at least for their just apprehensions in a case so momentous to them, and their posterity. If, say the Americans, there be a power in the parliament of Great Britain to tax us at pleasure, without our consent, and without representation, we are reduced from free men to a level with the subjects of France and Spain ; we are on the very footing of the slaves of a despotic prince ; for the parliament of Great Britain is that to us, which their princes are to them ; the two powers differ only in name, in their effects and consequences they are exactly similar, as like to each other as the water of the Mediterranean sea is to that of the British ocean. We have no will in the choice of the members who form this power ; our interests in many respects are not only alien and separate from theirs, but their interest is founded on, and promoted by our sufferings ; for the higher we are taxed, the more are they who tax us alleviated by the taxation. Having no share in constituting any part of this power, all its actions are unconnected with and independent of our will, we are destitute of all restraint upon it, and are left for ever without any legal means of redress under all oppressions that may befall us. The power
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being unlimited, the oppression may be correspondent with the power; a despotism is erected; and it is immaterial to us whether we suffer by the imperious will of one man, or whether the wills of five hundred are the cause of our ruin.—An assumed power is unlimited and excessive, and under such power neither the person nor the property of the subject is secure; but a delegated and constituted power is circumscribed either with respect to action, to the duration of that power, or to both: these are restraints which are not attendant on assumed power. Respecting us, this is an assumed and unlimited power, though it be otherwise on the part of Great Britain; and therefore we have every thing to apprehend from it. If it be said, we foresee terrors not likely to happen; we answer, a delegated power is ever circumscribed not so much with a view to what the party *will* do, as to what it *might* do were that restraint wanting. We have no share in appointing members of the British parliament; we have no restraint upon them when constituted; no ties of interest to attach us to their favour; our country very remote from theirs, and the interests of each, as far at least as concerns taxation, clash and stand at variance the one with the other. Thus circumstanced, abandoned to the sole disposal of the British Legislature, what is to be our condition! We are not on

a footing with British subjects; ours is: a state of slavery: and that integrity, that justice, that equity which they have a right to expect and demand at the hands of their representatives, must be construed, whenever extended towards us, into acts of tenderness, lenity, and mercy vouchsafed from a power despotic over us, and consequently under no obligation to confer such benefits.

Thus stands the reasoning on the part of America, in opposition to the argument of ministry. And I have dwelt the longer upon it, because as the Americans have not retracted from, but persisted in adhering firmly to these principles, ministry have thought proper to denounce war against them. We have then plainly before us the cause of this war, and its merits; a war, that must be attended with the most fatal consequences, and this, in preference to either of the other modes of proceeding. Not to assume the privilege of determining for others on the justness and propriety of this reasoning of the Americans, certain it is, they consider their whole liberty to be at stake; and in that case they cannot appeal to better judges of their cause than the people of England. When I say the people of England, I would not be understood to mean, or include, a ministry, a secret junto, or any body of men, or detached individuals who prostitute, professionally as it were, their consciences
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for gain ; who subsist on court favours dispersed among them from the purses of the public, and who from such motives are ever ready to embrace any opinions to which their interest may direct them, while their unfeigned devotion to venality mark them as disgraceful members of that community to which they belong : such men, I say, are too contemptible to be appealed to on a subject of this importance. It is the unprejudiced, unbiassed, and disinterested part of the public who can be supposed the only competent judges in the present case, whose minds are unwarpd by prejudices or interest, and will not permit mean sinister views to have any weight in the decision. The cause includes the public or civil liberty of a whole people ; with them, all is here at stake. And who are so good judges of this liberty as the people of England, who enjoy it in greater perfection than those of any other nation whatever, and who have bought it at a price that must have been deemed extravagant for the purchase of any other sublunary advantage whatever ? Where then can adequate judges be found in a cause where the dearest rights and interests of mankind are in question, if the appeal be not made to the public of England ? Here, a difference in religious sentiments will have no weight, nor will the country of those people who make their appeal tend to warp the
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the firmness of their judgment. Administration in most countries, especially in such as are despotic, blend religion with civil polity, and by mixing and interweaving them together make an engine from that connection subservient to their power and ambition. But the public of England will discriminate better than to suffer themselves to be so duped in the present case; they will make the true distinction between religion, and the rights of mankind; and will determine that mankind are not to be divested of their natural rights, be their religion, or their country what it may. They will perceive that the question here, is not whether the appellants be Americans, Asiatics, French or Germans; or whether in point of religion they be Dissenters, Mahometans, Papists or Lutherans; all which circumstances are foreign to the purpose where the rights of mankind are the point in agitation. They know as honest men, that it is an indispensable obligation on every one, and consequently on them as Englishmen, and though they be of the Church of England, to promote and secure, where it may fairly be done, the rights of mankind to Americans although they be Dissenters; to Asiatics although they be Mahometans; to Frenchmen although they be Papists; and to Germans although they be Lutherans. The country, and the religion of the people here

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in question, have then nothing to do in the present decision: a particular climate, the ceremonies of a church, or the different modes of religious faith, are not here under examination; they are all foreign and heterogeneous to the present purpose; and the only object before us is, the rights of mankind, and whether through our means they ought to be despoiled of, or supported in them.

Of this, I say, the public of England are the best judges, because they know too well the value of that liberty they have purchased by their ancestors, to sport with it in the case of others, and therefore cannot be supposed to give a wrong judgment; and again, because whatever is effected, cannot be done but by their assistance; since no war can be carried on, by whomsoever undertaken, but by the means of their treasures: so that it remains entirely with the public whether peace shall take place, or war shall be supported, that is, continued. However this may be determined, yet I may say, if there be two or three millions of persons on the same continent, and that these are almost unanimous in an opinion, and upon mature deliberation cannot avoid thinking as they do; should they regulate their actions in consequence thereof, this surely can never make them the deserving objects of all the vengeance ministry can pour upon them by
every

every misery attendant on a most cruel and destructive war ! If they have no pity for the Americans, they might at least have some tenderness for us ! Are we to be called forth at every fit of caprice and humour in ministry to waste our blood and consume our property ; and this before all other means of an equitable and just reconciliation have been attempted ? If the Americans judge wrong, it is easy by reasoning to convince them of their error ; and reason, not war, is the proper application to rational creatures. If the Americans judge right, then are they blameless : why then is recourse had to war ? Or are truth and justice, in this case, enveloped in such impervious darkness that the reason of man cannot pervade it ? If so, then this sudden immersing ourselves into war is rash and precipitate, and the certain and indubitable justice of the cause, which alone can authorize war, is uncertain and indeterminate. If it cannot be determined that they are wrong, neither can it be determined that ministry are in the right ; and in defiance of every persuasive influence, this nation is at least divided in opinion on the matter.— Men who are conscious they have the worst of the argument, decline reasoning, and have recourse to blows ; and ministry, after their example, reject reason, and assume the sword ; then follow violence and rapine unrestrained,

restrained, though no ways conducive to the main end and design : and thus the war is now prosecuting under their auspices along the sea-coasts of America, where their in-offensive and defenceless little towns and villages are fired, the inhabitants destroyed, and desolation marks the destructive ruin of the grand and awful navy of Great Britain as far as its ships can proceed. What a piratical employment for a navy which should awe the world, and give law to the real enemies of Britain ! If the Americans entertained suspicions of the justice and moderation of ministry in case they had acquiesced in all the terms required, this manner of making war upon them will be judged decisive of that clemency they were to expect, had they fallen even with the most abject submission at their feet. And what an idea must they entertain of men who, under the pretence of establishing peace and security, commit murder and rapine, and plunder and desolate wherever they go ; *auferre, trucidare, rapere falsis nominibus, imperium ; atque ubi solitudinem faciunt ibi pacem appellant**.

If neither humanity, nor a predilection for justice could prevail on ministry to decline adopting this sanguinary measure, war ; good policy ought however to have

* Tacitus, in V. Agricolaë.

deterred them from it. They might have been acquainted with the force of education; they might have known that minds adorned and enriched with sentiments of liberty, and breasts panting after it with more avidity than those of heroes after fame, are objects neither of cruelty, nor of contempt. They might have known the Americans are principally the descendants of Britons, who were remarked even by antiquity as a people formidable in resenting injuries, however easily wrought into compliance when their liberty was not affected by it,—*Ipsi Britanni delectum, ac obeunt tributa, et injuncta imperii munera impigre, si injuriæ absint: has ægre tolerant, jam domiti ut pareant, nondum ut serviant**. They might have known that there cannot be an act more injurious, than by oppression to drive a whole people into rebellion, and then to punish them for such resistance. That when a generous people are once roused to take up arms in defence of their liberties, courage inspired by liberty, like electrical fire, catches from breast to breast: and that war when once blown into a flame; is as contagious as an epidemical disease; with what fury it may rage, how far it may ex-

Tacitus, in *V. Agric. cap. 13.*

tend, what it may consume, and when it shall cease, are known only to the omniscience of Heaven.

The Americans, as descendants of Britons, are strongly attached to their own legislatures, and with good reason; for the constitution of America in King, councils, and assemblies, is consonant to the constitution of England. They are too sensible of the advantages derived to them from such a constitution, to give it up in exchange for any other mode of government whatever. An attempt to force them to a compliance hath raised a general ferment, and put all America in arms, which nothing is likely to appease, but gentleness, moderation, and justice. Vengeance, espoused by ministry, is oil to the flame, which, without the accession of so powerful an excitement, was of itself too fierce to be quenched by any engines of ministry on those principles. A numerous people insulted, and deprived of their rights, will become under all disadvantages a formidable adversary; and if they have seventy thousand well disciplined troops ready to take the field immediately, as the Americans have, and as many more who can shortly be mustered, I see not with ministry, what expectations of advantage are to be derived from war with such a people, and in such a cause. Spain was once in possession of the Netherlands; being

ing oppressed, they revolted, and threw off the Spanish yoke; nor could she recover again the dominion of the Netherlands, though Spain was at that time the most powerful monarchy in Europe. *Les Hollandois ne se feroient jamais révoltés contre les Espagnols si la tyrannie des Espagnols n'étoit parvenue à un excès si énorme, que les Hollandois ne pouvoient devenir plus malheureux: Anti-Machiavel, ch. 2. Il a secoué le joug de la domination Espagnole, qui étoit alors la monarchie la plus formidable de l'Europe. ch. 5.* If so small, so weak a people, but inspired with liberty, made so glorious an achievement against oppression and the whole force of the Spanish monarchy, we may draw a very rational conclusion from thence, that at the close of the present war, when my countrymen shall become ruined by the weight of taxes exacted from them in support of it, and the nation exhausted of its resources both in men and money, we may then compare notes with the Spanish monarchy; or at best, make terms which might now be agreed on without an effusion of blood and waste of treasure; and without risking the loss of America for ever.

But war is the cry, ministry are determined upon it; because they themselves feel not the scourges of war. They sit secure, at once removed both from its dangers and

and sufferings; and the emolument of their places renders them insensible of the burthen to be suffered by the people in support of it. To them it is no more than a transient dream, and the deepest of its wounds leaves not so much as a trace either on memory or conscience. They are conscious of not having a perpetuity in the office they hold; that they are only mere tenants of the day; they prepare against the evil hour in which they shall be turned out; and therefore to breed confusion is favourable to their designs, as it gives them an opportunity to scramble for more, and to carry it away with less risk of a discovery. Were not this the case, some attention might have been paid to a scheme for the total rejection of the Americans, rather than to involve us in a war with them, which cannot fail of being highly injurious to these kingdoms, let the event of this war be what it will. It hath been much doubted, and with good reason, whether the retaining of America, even upon any terms, can be beneficial to these kingdoms. It hath not yet been made appear, that colonisation is favourable to Great Britain; much less to continue America as a colony whose extent of territory is immense; and this, at the distance of three thousand miles. Before war had been undertaken against America, it ought first to have

have been clearly proved, that America as a colony, every circumstance considered, is an absolute advantage to this nation; and next, that this advantage was positively such as would more than indemnify us for the loss sustained by so expensive and destructive a war. Till these points are settled beyond the possibility of a doubt, we are fighting without knowing what we contend for; we are acting the part of a madman who in his phrensy seizes on every opportunity to destroy himself, without knowing the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the motive on which he acts, or being conscious of the violence of that disorder which hurries him along.

If the two last wars with France and Spain, which consumed so much of our wealth, increased to so enormous a sum our national debt, and laid such a burthen of taxes upon us ever since, to the detriment of trade, and oppression of the subject; if these, I say, were incurred*, as they certainly were, to promote the interest of the Ame-

* And most certain it is, that both the former *Spanish* (or the *No-Search*) War, and the latter *French* (or the *Acadia and Ohio*) War, were begun and carried on principally with a View to promote the immediate interests of the Northern Colonies. *Dean Tucker's Appeal to the Landed Interest*, p. 14.

ricans ; and annual† sums to a considerable amount have been granted from hence, as bounties on sundry of their articles of commerce : surely their rejection is an object well deserving the attention of every impartial person in these kingdoms, if we mean either to live in peace with our neighbours, or prevent our ruin by an accumulated load of national debt. As their disputes formerly forced us into wars with France and Spain, the like no doubt will in future be reiterated ; and let them pay what part of the expence they can, we well know the heaviest share, nay almost the whole burthen of the war must and will fall to our lot.— Every dispute with foreign powers, and brought on by the Americans, must be carried on and decided in Europe ; and the matter to furnish these contests is so various and abundant, that we shall by their means be involved almost perpetually in war ; and this the rather, as the party in whose defence it is undertaken, and who is the cause

† And as to Indigo had it not been for the many Hundred Thousands of Pounds sterling, which Great Britain has granted in Bounties and Premiums to promote the Culture of this article in the *Carolinas* and *Virginia*, &c. Id. p. 56.—And others when imported from *America*, are not only allowed to be imported duty free, which is just enough ; but also have enjoyed for many years, the benefit of large and munificent Bounties given by the Parliament of *Great-Britain*. Id. ib. p. 55, see also p. 56.

of the difference, will bear so small a proportion of the expence: and this admits of no remedy, for I am inclined to think however willing they might be to contribute largely, their inability as an infant state, or at best, far short of maturity, would be a sufficient plea in their behalf. Thus would their contraband commerce at all times be furnishing cause of contention; and as we must as constantly come forward and stand forth the principal actor in every tragical scene of the theatre of war, we shall, having the adversary at our very gates, be ruined as a commercial kingdom within the space of a century, from the necessity of giving them that protection by which alone they can be secured to us, while the sufferings of the Americans will, from their low estate, be almost imperceptible; for he that hath nothing to lose, can hardly be reduced to a lower condition; and he that hath much to lose, by losing that, is ruined. And thus we shall at the same time feel the fatal effects of a decreasing commerce, and the accumulating load of national debt, which will create such an enormous burthen of taxes, without having the means of paying them, that in the end it will be found the only relief under such difficulties will be a general failure of public credit, which though a necessary, must be the dreadful alternative! In short, the funds from their foundations must break up, and the

the sufferings of individuals must become the sacrifice to compensate for, and to avert a general, a public, and universal ruin.

These are some of the fatal effects likely to result to Great Britain from supporting America as a colony. The two last wars in which we were engaged on account of America*, it is said, cost us one hundred and fifty millions sterling. How is Great Britain to be reimbursed this sum alone? What adequate compensation can be expected from America, even supposing it now, and without further expence, subjugated to the will of ministry? No man I presume will judge it capable of paying off this sole debt and interest within a century, and perhaps not in two. During which period, if we are to protect it at a rate proportionable to what has been already expended in its defence, what will it not cost us supposing we were able to bear the expence? But lest these contingents should not accelerate our ruin with that expedition which seems to be re-

* In the former Spanish (or *no-search*) war, you spent above sixty millions sterling, including the extraordinary sums raised, and the fresh debts contracted:—And the last, *French, Ohio, or Acadia War*, you spent above Ninety millions sterling, if computed after the same manner.—*Dean Tucker's Appeal to the Landed Interest*, p. 20.—And Lord Chesterfield says, "Upon the whole, then, the acquisition of Canada has cost us fourscore millions sterling." Letter 328.

quired by some people, we are now led into an expensive and ruinous war against these very Americans for whose protection such large sums have been so lavishly squandered away. If from the event of war they are to remain a colony of Great Britain, this American war, in all probability, will be no sooner concluded, than we shall have a French and Spanish war again upon our hands for their protection. War seems to be the favourite object of ministry, but the object of a commercial Nation should be peace, because peace introduces riches and plenty, while the attendants on war are desolation and beggary. But instead of peace, we seem to be in a fair way of dancing the round from one war to another without any respite. In the interim it is by no means certain, or even probable, notwithstanding the pretended security of ministry, that we shall not be engaged in an American, French, and Spanish war at the same time. The good faith and promises of Princes when it becomes their interest to break through and cancel them, is upon record; and the weakness of relying on, or giving credit to such flattering tales, wholly inexcusable. They have either a natural propensity to the precept laid down by Machiavel, or a wonderful aptitude for learning it. Let us attend to what the great political teacher advances on this subject: " Every man knows how
 " honour-

“ honourable it is in a Prince to keep his
 “ word and good faith inviolable, and to
 “ maintain his integrity. Our times, how-
 “ ever, have furnished us with striking ex-
 “ amples to prove that those Princes have
 “ succeeded best, who have not been over
 “ scrupulous herein, but have had recourse
 “ to deceit and artifice; and that in the
 “ conclusion these have always gained the
 “ superiority and advantage over such as
 “ made a profession and practice of honour
 “ and good faith.”——“ A prudent
 “ Prince, therefore ought not to confine
 “ himself to his faith and promise whenever
 “ the observance of them makes against his
 “ interest, or that the causes no longer sub-
 “ sist which brought on such engagements.
 “ True it is, if men were honest, this pre-
 “ cept would be naught; but as mankind
 “ are in general knaves, and will forfeit their
 “ word with you, therefore you are under
 “ no obligation to keep yours with them:
 “ and a Prince can never be at a loss for a
 “ good plea on such occasions.” *Quanto sia*
laudabile in uno Principe mantenere la fide, e
vivere con integrità, e non con astutia, ciascuno
lo intende. Nondimeno se vede per isperienza
ne nostri tempi quelli principi haver fatto gran
 cose, che della fide hanno tenuto poco conto, &
che hanno saputo con astutia aggirare li cervelli
de gli huomini, & alla fine hanno superato quelli
che si sono fondati in su la lealtà.——Non
 puo

*puo per tanto un Signor prudente, ne debbe osservare la fide, quanto tal osservantia gli torni contro, e che sono spente le cagioni che la fecen promettere; E si gli huomini fusseno tutti buoni, questo precetto non saria buono, ma perche sono tristi, E non l'osserverebbono a te, tu ancora non l'hai da osservar a loro, ne mai ad un Principe mancarono cagioni legitime di colorare l'inosservanza.** And again, “ A certain Prince of
 “ our time†, whom it is not proper to
 “ mention by name, was ever recommend-
 “ ing peace and good faith in all his dis-
 “ course; but had he adhered to them in
 “ practice, he would have been infallibly
 “ stripped both of his kingdom and his re-
 “ putation.” *Alcun Principe di questi tempi
 il quale non e ben nominare, non predica mai altro
 che pace, E fide, E l'una E l'altro quando l'ha-
 vesse osservata, gli havrebbe piu volte tolto lo
 stato, E la riputatione‡.* With what caution
 then ought we to proceed in this American
 war; if we ought to proceed at all? And
 what regard is due in so momentous a mat-

* Il Prin. di Machiavelli. cap. 18.

† He alludes to Ferdinand, King of Castile and of Arragon, who by perfidy and treachery conquered the Kingdoms of Naples and Navarre.

‡ Machiav. ut suprà.

ter to the good faith and promises, which men think they are in some measure justified in the breach of, both from custom and precept, whenever favourable opportunities shall present themselves.

But let us suppose in favour of ministry that neither France nor Spain are capable of perfidy or treachery; let us suppose too that both are insensible to their own interests, and that of their subjects; and lastly let us suppose (as we are in the humour for supposing any thing, however inconsistent it may be) that an unusual squeamishness of conscience shall induce them to a strict observance of their promise, and an implicit adherence to good faith, in preference to all other considerations and political advantages. This is granting, it is true, more than any opponent can desire or expect; more than reason, experience, or the nature of the thing can possibly admit of: yet, all this granted, the American war is still certain; and as certain will be the burthen of taxes upon the people to defray the expence of it.— This is a ministerial, not a national war; and it is so through our own fault; and the people must be contented to bear the consequences. We shall do well therefore to contemplate them beforehand, that when they come rushing like a deluge upon us, we may be in some degree prepared to bear
up

up against our misfortunes. If America is to continue to be a colony of Great Britain, it is evident no limits can be prescribed to our waste of blood and treasure in support of it : At peace, or at war with America, there is no truce nor respite from charge and expence on its account. For if we are at war with it, we must certainly bear the expence of that war ; if at peace, then its premiums and bounties come into question, and what is more insufferable, its protection ; for this will necessarily lead us into perpetual wars with France and Spain : the principal part of which burthen must be laid on our shoulders, if not the whole of it, by reason of the debilitated state in which the present war will leave America, supposing we become victorious. Thus, at peace or at war with America, it matters not which, so long as it remains a colony, we must be sufferers by its continuing such ; and the reiterated wars we shall be engaged in with France and Spain, will drain the very vitals of the people of landed property in this kingdom, and at the same time give so torpid a check to commerce, that even the most flourishing state would not be able to bear up against such weighty calamities. An occasional war may be submitted to, and it may perhaps be consistent with good policy on particular occasions to engage in it ; but for a Nation whose profession is not war, like that of the Romans, but commerce ;

for such a Nation, I say, to be ever pushing itself forward into war, or so to plan its measures that they must of necessity promote it, this, seems to me, the height of indiscretion and folly.

To be *successful* in this American war, be it ever so ruinous and expensive, is nothing more than receiving a sure and certain pledge of a variety of endless expence in future. But we are engaged in it; ministry will not retract; and as it is an object of the highest importance to this nation, it certainly demands the attention of every man of reflection in it. The event of war is doubtful, but our ruin seems not to be so; that is placed on a more desperate footing. If successful, we *must* be ruined: if unsuccessful, we *may* be ruined. A long war with the Americans will reduce us to a state of weakness hitherto unknown; and if victory inclines at length for us, it will only insure to us future burthens and expences, future broils with France and Spain; and America will be so debilitated by the shock, that she must fall back into her primitive state: Weak and unable to make any efforts, she must be nursed and nurtur'd up anew, the burthen and expence of which, is to fall once more upon Great Britain; who, must become again a sufferer, not only by perpetrating the violence, but afterwards, by repairing the injuries that violence hath occasioned: And how is all
this

this to be borne?—If at the close of a long war we are unsuccessful, and this may probably be the case, what will be our condition? I will not describe it; let every one represent to his own mind a nation exhausted of men and money in a fruitless war; suppose the evil present; and let him ask himself, what will then be the temper of the people, and how they are to be pacified? whether some convulsion may not follow this ministerial war, into which the impartial uninfluenced Public have been reluctantly forced? and what compensation may not the people, driven to desperation and despair, demand, and seek in their frantic rage, as an atonement for so profuse a waste of blood and treasure? It may be answered, perhaps, (conformable to a late mode of proceeding near this Metropolis) that the militia shall satisfy them. But the militia may be otherwise employed; weak, languid, enervated, exhausted of men and treasure, as this Nation will then be, it is not possible to imagine that our natural enemies, will, under these circumstances, give us any respite, whatever they may do till then: France and Spain have an interest in our ruin, and they would certainly improve so promising an opportunity to effect it. The militia must be called forth to repel the invaders, in which enterprise their prowess might be wholly employed. Moreover the sentiments of one

corps of militia are not to determine the sense of the militia of the whole kingdom on the present war. There are other counties whose militia do by no means coincide in sentiment on this point, with the militia of that county which has addressed. That corps, it is true, hath set the example, an example pernicious and dangerous enough, for obvious reasons, and as such it must be esteemed in the opinions of the militia throughout the kingdom, as I do not hear that any of them have as yet thought it reasonable or prudent to follow so bold a precedent. And there may be cause to surmise, that before this American war is brought to a conclusion, that good reasons will offer to induce this militia to wish they had not been altogether so precipitate in the measure. Some singular advantages ought to result to the people from the militia; we feel it in general onerous, but every person resident in the country knows it is attended with no small additional inconveniences; the Public, however, are content to submit to the establishment, in this confidence, that whenever they shall be called upon by their country, they will resolutely defend and support it, together with its just rights and liberties, against every invader; and nobly acquit themselves at the same time of their duties both as citizens, and as soldiers. On this consideration alone is a militia supportable; this removed, insupportable

portable and intolerable ; and must be considered as an engine in the pay of the people, but in the power of ministry for the sole purpose of establishing despotism on the ruins of freedom and liberty.

But to return to this American war, which affords nothing better than an unbounded prospect of disaster and desolation, without being attended with one benignant ray of utility or public good to animate any part of the whole scene. As yet, Victory makes not her appearance ; and when that shall happen, she may hover awhile on each side of the Atlantic, before she makes her pause. It is as uncertain *when*, as it is *where*, she will at last take her stand. If we may be allowed to judge from that enthusiasm with which the Americans have espoused their cause, and which in war fails not to inspire with the most undaunted courage, and consequently no contemptible object in the present case : If we may form any idea of the abilities of their generals from their specimens of their conduct near Boston, and in Canada : If we may be permitted to reason from the number of their forces already in arms, their good discipline, equal at least to the raw levies, and foreign mercenaries sent against them ; and the thousands equally good they still withhold from the field ; if we consider the advantages they derive from climate,

nature of the country, and their superior knowledge of it; our remote distance from them; and our divisions at home, to which they oppose an unshaken and invincible unanimity; I say, if we may be intitled to argue from these combined circumstances so favourable to their cause, not to mention a multiplicity of others which cannot fail of suggesting themselves to the mind of every one of us, can we suppose, even under the most flattering series of events, that we have not entered upon a war likely to prove of long continuance, that will probably be protracted for a number of years, and consequently highly injurious to these kingdoms? We have to contend with men who in this contest consider their all to be at stake; we have to cope with neither French nor Spaniard, but the descendants of Britons, our ancestors, and who no doubt will be as resolute in battle as they were; they possess the same desire for liberty, and liberty has ever inspired men with the firmest courage; and to this they have added enthusiasm, which infallibly keeps up and supports the spirit of courage and perseverance to the last; it is this, which makes heroes in war, and in civil life those geniuses we read of as statesmen, philosophers, poets and the like; and if we credit *Cicero*, never

never did any * great genius exist who did not possess more or less of enthusiasm: *Nemo unquam vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino fecit.* Nat. Deor. 2, 66. As tho' it were an emanation of the celestial power transfused into the minds of men to brighten and invigorate them for a season, that the agent may be thereby enabled to compleat the business assigned him. Whether this be so, or not; let it be real, or imaginary; a fact, or a vision; it is altogether immaterial in the present case: The Americans possess the enthusiasm, or think they do so; they have confidence in it, and the effect will be the same. Many of the antients, and particularly the Romans, did so before them, and numberless instances might be collected from their history in proof of it, and that it was as constantly attended with success in battle, as on these occasions they failed not to establish victory in the slaughter of their enemies. And how much soever modern heroes may affect to despise the notion, and to treat it with contempt, while their own excellence, if any they have, consists prin-

* And Milton either possessed this enthusiasm, or fancied that he did, when speaking of the divine wisdom, he says, B. 7. v. 29.

While thou
Vistest my slumbers nightly, &c.

cipally

cipally in protracting a war to their emolument and profit; yet I will venture to say, that a people under this influence, is the most dangerous, because the most desperate enemy that can be attacked. And should the Americans, under this influence, defeat our forces as often as they join battle with them, I must confess it would not surprize me; for it would be no more, nor even so much, as the French did under the like enthusiasm both at Orleans, Patay, and in every rencounter in that campaign, under the auspices, conduct, inspiration, or what you please of *Joan D'Arc*, or the Maid of Orleans in the year 1429: And this too, when the situation of their affairs was become almost desperate, and our troops had been flushed with repeated success, and every where victorious till the time of her public appearance, when she inspired the desponding French army with an enthusiasm which totally turned the balance of war, gave them to surmount all difficulties, made them every where victorious over their conquerors, who were either destroyed or fled before her.

If it may not be admitted that this enthusiasm for liberty will entirely destroy our hopes of success in America; at least, the probability of its protracting the war, cannot be denied. This enthusiasm, this spirit for liberty is gone forth throughout that land,

land, and has affected each sex, and all ages. The women are as much under its influence, as the men : and children who have yet to learn to speak, lip the word, LIBERTY, even in the remotest corners of that continent. If all this tends not immediately to victory, it tends at least to firmness and resolution to support the contest ; the contest supported the war is protracted ; and this, I apprehend, will be attended with more fatal consequence to Great Britain than a sudden and total defeat and miscarriage in the enterprize ; as this will give a decisive stroke to a contest greatly injurious to these kingdoms, but which will become much more so by the continuance of it. But setting aside all extraordinary efforts on the part of the Americans, there is no reason to surmise this war will have a short issue. Great Britain can bring no land forces against them with which they are not able to contend with one fourth part of their forces. It is not one defeat, nor ten, that can be decisive of their fate ; their armies can be reinforced immediately, upon the spot, as occasion requires, and with as good troops as those they lost. When our Navy has finished its plundering, pillaging, and burning, on their coasts, there will be an end of its operations ; the little injury it can do them more than this, is not worth naming. If our army marches into the country, it can be no support to them, no
retreat

retreat for them; having the whole continent
 for enemies, the further they march inland,
 the more easily will all communication be
 cut off, and if they do not proceed forward,
 how are they to conquer? They must
 know, from the event of last year, that the
 Americans are not to be frightened by the
 bare appearance of troops sent to their conti-
 nent; and if they were not so last year, we
 may readily conclude they will not be so
 this, or the next, as they are better prepared
 for their reception. The want of fortified
 places is in favour of the natives, especially
 when attended with an extent of country,
 for should our army take from them an ad-
 vantageous post, it may as easily be reduced
 to the necessity of quitting it, every thing
 around them is hostile, and all would con-
 spire to make them quit the possession by
 a variety of means; nor can any thing of
 that kind be long tenable where the enemy
 is so greatly superior in numbers. We can
 send no army to America sufficient to make
 it bring forth all its troops into the field;
 and could we do this, we should be mistaken
 if we imagined it could reduce them to a
 starving condition. Agriculture would be
 carried on nearly after the same manner it
 now is, as well as their manufactures; there
 is hardly any branch of either that could not
 be executed by men through age unfit for
 arms; by the women; and by youth yet
 immature

immature for service; those would furnish their troops with all the necessaries of life that warriors can require. As a substitute for specie they have issued a paper credit; and perhaps without either, they might have been enabled to carry on the war. Specie is a necessary medium in foreign traffic; but with them, all foreign commerce will be cut off, or become inconsiderable; and therefore they have more specie than theirs will require. And were they without it, as the war is domestic, it might possibly be carried on as the Indians do theirs, or as all countries originally did. Or could it not, yet by means of this paper credit which they have, and which answers in every mode of circulation among them the purpose of specie, the war is not like to be discontinued for want of the latter.

Which way soever we turn our eyes, it is obvious we are threatened with the miseries of a long war with a people whose poverty excludes us from making any reprisals for our losses; whose want of wealth has hitherto shielded them from luxury, its concomitant vices, and their enervating consequences; and who are therefore better enabled to support themselves under fatigue, labour, and the almost intolerable severities of war; and whose courage is equal, whose discipline is little if at all inferior, and whose numbers far exceed all the veteran troops, together

gether with the raw new levies, both foreign and domestic, that can be collected from all quarters, to be sent against them: whilst their generals in point of courage, conduct, and ability, (odious comparisons apart) would do honour to Great Britain itself. What do these united advantages portend, but a total defeat on our part; or a long protracted war, if we are able to bear up against them? For as to Russian succours, the Powers of Europe will not suffer them to be employed against America. No, say they, (with France at their head) like the Cadmean heroes destroy each other as fast as you please; but we will have no Russians introduced, to spare the slaughter of your own troops; or to improve theirs in the art of war; confine the war to yourselves, we wish you to be humiliated, and this will effect it: whatever advantages you may propose to yourself from this *Καδμεία νίκη*, should any arise, we will sedulously wait the opportunity of converting them to our emolument, and your loss. But if you employ Russian troops, your own will be kept in reserve, and these may defeat our intended enterprize.

If therefore the government of Russia were weak, or wicked enough, to let to hire thirty thousand of its troops for this expedition, (and common report asserts such a tender was made) they could not be accepted

cepted without engaging us in a war with the Powers of Europe : so that all resources of this nature must either be renounced, or by accepting them we must be content with involving ourselves in further difficulties. Moreover, it is almost incredible, (unless we give implicit faith to what * Lord Chesterfield has advanced) that Russia at any time made that offer, as it would be taking a measure at once both weak, and wicked ; weak, because that power hath so recently terminated a war wherein the loss of its subjects has not been inconsiderable, and even before the commencement of that war its country was not nearly half peopled ; to exhaust then, and make a further sacrifice of its inhabitants in a cause where it has no real interest or concern, instead of employing every mean of promoting population in its half peopled towns and wide extended deserts, would be not only a weakness, but an unpardonable political error. As to the wickedness, it is a traffic which stands self-condemned ; the impropriety of it in a political, the inhumanity in a moral, and the uncharitableness in a religious view, are too striking, and plead too powerfully against

* The Court of Petersburg is beggarly, profuse, greedy, and by no means scrupulous. Why should we not slip in there and outbid them?—And if we bid handsomely, I do not believe the *bonne foi* of that Court would stand in the way. *Letter 291.*

a practice which on mere intuition would stand condemned, exploded, and execrated by every friend, and patron of mankind.

“ What ! is the human species to be placed
 “ on the level with dogs and bulls which are
 “ let to hire for the fight ? The institution
 “ of the military is for the defence of their
 “ country, but the ends both of war and of
 “ commerce are perverted when troops are
 “ let to hire. We have been told that it is
 “ unlawful to make a traffic with things
 “ that are sacred ; And what is more sacred
 “ than the blood of men ? ” *L'institution du*
soldat, est pour la defence de la patrie ; les louer
à d'autres, comme on vend des chiens et des
taureaux pour le combat ; c'est ce me semble per-
vertir à la fois le but du negoce et de la guerre.
On dit qu'il n'est pas permis de vendre des choses
saintes, eh ! qu'y a-t-il de plus sacré que le sang
des hommes ? Anti-Machiavel, ch. ult.

We are then left to ourselves to carry on and conclude the war, unless with the same rashness with which it was undertaken we shall think proper to plunge ourselves into further difficulties with the neighbour states, like him who not satisfied with seeking revenge on a hornet which had stung him, incensed the whole nest, which surrounded and stung him to death. Here are two great evils set before us : War against America with our own strength ; or war against America and some of the states of Europe at the same

same time, in consequence of receiving foreign succour. The least of these two evils will be the taking the American war entirely upon ourselves; and for these reasons, because in the end it will be least expensive; and may also prevent our being swallowed up by a general convulsion which might otherwise happen in Europe, while we were busily engaged in prosecuting this American war. Far should we be attacked at the same time by France and Spain, in spite of our alliances, Great Britain and Hanover must go to the bottom, or the American war must be given up, that we may be enabled to defend ourselves. In which case, America would lose no time to improve its strength by land and by sea; and as an attempt has been made to destroy its liberty, no succour could be expected from that quarter against our enemies, and we shall have no reason to complain if it does not join them to retaliate the injury. To act then with our sole strength against America, desperate as the event will, I apprehend, determine it to be, is the only alternative; and this can flatter the most sanguine expectations of those who promote this war, with the hope of nothing more favourable than a protracted, and of course a ruinous war to these Kingdoms: for if our forces are not defeated, and shortly too, the contrary must rather be imputed to fortune
and

and accident than to any other cause, since from circumstances in general, the advantage evidently preponderates on the side of America.

In the second Punic war, Annibal marched with a powerful army into the heart of the Roman empire ; and the contest on the part of the Romans was no longer for glory, but for safety and liberty. During the space of eighteen years, for so long that war continued, neither Annibal could subdue the Romans, nor the Romans conquer Annibal. At length it is true the Romans were victorious ; and the price of victory was almost their ruin : for so great had been their slaughter, that on a comparison of the injuries each party had received, that which at last became victorious bore the strongest marks of a conquered people, *Sed a deo cladium atrocitate terribilius, ut si quis conferat damna utriusque populi, similior victo sit populus qui vicit*, says Florus. But Annibal though he had marched his army which was very powerful, almost over every part of the empire ; though he was himself a most consummate general, fortunate, and victorious in almost every enterprize and engagement ; though he gained a complete victory with a dreadful slaughter of almost the whole of the Roman army at the first battle ; and though many cities and provinces of the empire, submitted to, declared for, and as-

sisted

sisted him against the Romans, during the course of the war: yet, all he could accomplish, and the sum of his atchievement amounted only to this, that he had made a great slaughter of the enemy, ruined the country, protracted the war for the space of eighteen years, and was at last obliged to withdraw his army, and retire to defend his own country. So ended this destructive expedition, even under the conduct of Annibal himself. But where are our Annibals to send against America? That Army, one half of which it was vainly, ignorantly, and ridiculously asserted would march in triumph from one extremity of that continent to the other, what has it performed? Could any thing be more weak in its operations, excepting only the judgment of those who promised us so much from it, and the credulity of those who gave credit to it? In the two little conflicts which happened, has not a small body of that enemy whose whole force they affected to despise and condemn, so severely treated a body of troops sent to dislodge them, that they staggered at least, if they did not absolutely retreat; and was it not found necessary to send them a strong reinforcement lest they should be cut off; and did they not suffer a great slaughter though they fought under the protecting fire of fleet and batteries? And had they not before been repulsed, slaughtered,

and obliged, by this very enemy, to seek protection under the cannon of Boston? Is this the boasted triumphal march of our troops over all America: and is this the enemy which the wisdom of ministry, and their weak abettors, affected to despise? and where, after all that has been done, is contempt due, if, however, that contempt be not more properly exchanged for just indignation! How different is this beginning of our enterprize from that of Annibal at the battle of Carnes! Yet we were promised as much, nay much more from this army, for one half of it was to subdue all America; instead of which, its great merit has been to be able defend itself, though in a half-starved condition, against the enemy it was to conquer; and this could only be effected by means of the strongest fortifications that could be devised for its security. Having as yet made no conquest, and being debilitated both by action and inaction, consequently no province, city, or town has declared itself in our favour, as a part of the Roman empire did for that general: on the contrary, the forts of Chamblée and St. John's in Canada have surrendered to, and are taken possession of by a party of the enemy's troops which has been sent against those places; and it is doubtful whether Quebec be not in their actual possession at this time; and if so, they have made themselves masters of all
Canada,

Canada, the conquest of which cost us, according to * Lord Chesterfield's account, no less than fourscore millions sterling. Had the enterprize of Annibal in his first operations been attended with inauspicious disadvantages like these, however great his skill, courage, and abilities might be, I am inclined to think he would have retreated in despair to have prevented his ruin. We have no general who claims the military abilities of Annibal, and if there were, he would not have an army like that of Annibal to command. Is it for these reasons that the wisdom of ministry orders this shattered army to remain where it is? But they are to be reinforced. True. But can you send to America an army of seventy or eighty thousand men complete for the field? Perhaps an army somewhat less than this might protract the war, and thereby become beneficial to ministry and their friends; but it is doubtful whether such an army would be able to conquer America. If it could, much time would be required to effect it; and much bloodshed on both sides would disgrace the conquest. But whether it could, or not, certain it is ministry cannot send it. To talk of any reinforcement they can send as effectual to this purpose, is as frivolous now, as it was futile before to make an ostentatious

* Lord Chesterfield's Letter, 328.

tatious parade of what that army would do which was sent. How that army succeeded we all know, for we all know it did not succeed: and we shall know when reinforcements are sent, that they will succeed no better. These expedients may perhaps serve to delude the vulgar, but those who can see, and reason, will not suffer themselves to be made the dupes of so shallow an artifice. The same wisdom which dictated the war, and the same counsels which directed former measures, will preside over the future. Their effects are but too well known and felt, and the Americans would be unreasonable indeed to wish for any circumstance more favourable to their cause; and we, to expect success under the auspices of such an administration. If the enterprise of Annibal proved fatal to his country, though undertaken and prosecuted under so many apparent advantages not one of which attends ours against America, why may not our persisting therein render it as fatal to us, as that was to Carthage? It is with nations as with individuals, ill-judged security and unfeigned contempt, are too often the means, and prognostics of ruin. We have no idea that the Americans can conquer; and I have no opinion of the possibility of our conquering them; if we do, I am persuaded it must be effected by their fault, rather than be the consequence of our councils, or any
army

army we can send against them. True it is, we may keep up a long and tedious war; and this is all we can do, and, I presume, all that administration are now doing, or indeed mean to do. How the people will relish so burthensome an expense, future time will declare; for a war so carried on will necessarily reduce us to the condition the poet speaks of, which is truly pitiable even when attended with victory, *Propriusque fuere periclo quibus superate datum*. Success upon these terms would almost bring us to ruin.

This American war cannot be supported without very extraordinary supplies. Monies must be levied, and new additional taxes imposed on the subject, not only to support the war, but to make good the deficiencies of duties and customs of American commerce which is now at an end. How administration can suppose we should cheerfully submit to such burthens, and in such a cause, is to me inconceiveable, if they consider the Public in any better light than as so many beasts devoted to bear whatever weight their caprice shall be pleased to load them withal. Since the last war, though a profound peace has subsisted, uninterrupted by expensive squabbles either in Europe or America, yet the public has received little or no relief in the article of taxation; taxes have been continued almost in the same state,

state, as though we had been constantly carrying on a vigorous war. These taxes were heavy, burthenfome, and grievous, and the people had a right to expect alleviation and redress in so important a matter, and in proportion to the oppression. But instead of redress, these burthens are now to be redoubled, by this new device of plunging us into an American war.

War, with any state, and eventual as it may be, will ever promote the designs of a self-interested ministry. It is a political maxim adopted in most countries, when a people are dissatisfied with ministry, for ministry to divert, if possible, that attention from themselves, by introducing some other object, and this object is generally war. Thus security results to ministry from the averted attention of the public from them, to war, as sailors derive safety from throwing out a barrel to amuse the whale. The people have no confidence in ministry; and ministry are conscious of it. They hold their office by a precarious tenure, and hope so long as they amuse the public, that they may remain unnoticed; but if that public has leisure to reflect, they expect to be removed; because the grounds of their complaints are just and reasonable. War being therefore for the present advantage of a ministry so situated, and in truth any war in preference to no war, we cannot be surprized to

to see them engage in it with keenness and avidity, or promote its continuance with a settled and determined resolution, preferably to any other mode of proceeding with the Americans, even though they were conscious of the certain insufficiency of any force they can send against them for the purpose of conquest. There are besides, other contingencies which make war a ministerial harvest; their relations, friends, and numerous dependents, which my Lord Bolingbroke somewhere emphatically stiles the *lumber of a ministry, and the furniture of a court*, are by this mean provided for, and liberally supported at the public expence: in proportion as the property of the subject is thus legally plundered to the injury of the whole community, these individuals are filling their bosoms with the sheaves which were cultivated at the charge of others by the careful hands of industry. But it imports not whence this accumulation is made; nor who are the sufferers; to such a state of distress are we now reduced, that ministry make their demands upon us, and however exorbitant, the public is under the necessity of complying with them. It is in vain to look for justice or moderation from the hands of ministry; they have purchased their power and influence, and must be refunded their purchase money with a large surplus, and this can only come from the body of the

people. So long therefore as we decline the vindication of our rights, and the securing of our property from becoming the prey of ministry, so long will ministry, which is daily increasing in power and approaching to political omnipotence, proceed to load us with their enormous burthens ; till at last we must sink under their rigour, and the load of despotism they will heap upon us. If a very small share of that sedulous art and artifice, disguise and seduction, avarice and ambition, intrigue and political manœuvres, which have been so uniformly maintained, supported and practised both at Court and in Cabinet, had been converted into a firm unshaken regard for the public weal, this American war had not now been the topic of conversation, or the cause of impoverishing this Nation ; and persuaded I am, that ministry in such case would as soon have thought of inviting an army of forty thousand French into the heart of this Kingdom, as to have sent thirty thousand troops to America to make war on its inhabitants.

But war is advantageous to a ministry ; the sword therefore is drawn : and true it is, that a madman can draw a sword, which a wise man may not be able, when he would, to replace in the scabbard. War is now gone forth, as a tempest howling over the peaceful deep, to throw every thing into
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confusion, and to deal destruction on every side. Who shall set bounds to the devastation, limit its duration, and restore peace! Innumerable obstructions will every day arise to prevent it; the advantages either party may have gained in the warfare, the confidence each will entertain of its superior strength, the habit the people will have contracted for war, and their disinclination to follow any other employment for a maintenance, the enmity and aversion each party may entertain for the other from repeated violence and injuries reciprocally given and received, with a thousand other causes likely to start forth, will make a reconciliation, however necessary or desirable, become extremely difficult, if at all practicable, 'till conquest be determined either on the one side or on the other. So dreadful are then these solemn appeals to Heaven! Ministry have made the appeal: I hope they have confidence in the justice of their cause: I protest I have none. But with millions, I may say, in this kingdom, am utterly averse to the measure, and wash my hands of all the guilt of each drop of the innocent blood that already has been, or in future shall be spilt on this melancholy occasion.

Since this American contest has been in agitation, a notion has prevailed both in public and private, that the landed interest of Great Britain are the abettors of ministry
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in this American war. I am persuaded, whatever grounds there might be for such an assertion, that it cannot be, generally speaking, true: for certain it is, if their humanity did not lead them to be averse to this war, their interest however ought to have made them detest it. But as the landholders make so important a part of the body of the people of Great Britain, it is necessary to remove the prepossessions of some, and to inform the judgment of others by giving this subject a short discussion. In the present case, it is necessary to divide the landholders into two classes. The one includes the landholders who have some profession, business, employment, or any other mean, from which they derive a revenue or income abstractedly from that of their lands. The other class includes those landholders whose sole revenue is the rents and profits of their lands, without having separate and distinct incomes like the former. Now I would not be supposed to deny that there are many of the landholders of this first class who join the ministry. Ministry have so many lucrative appointments to dispose of in every profession and in every department of life men can be engaged in, together with so many sinecures, and douceurs for every emergency, that it is not reasonable in our time to imagine that those who possess them should not become as indifferent

different to the calamities of this war, as they are to the burthen this war will bring upon their landed property, as such appointments exceed oftentimes the whole value of their rents; and in any case must considerably overbalance any taxation their lands are likely to be subjected to on that account.—

As these emoluments from ministry, are not disposed of on terms which leave to the possessors the freedom of acting, there is little room to expect they would relinquish such advantages, and the side of ministry, for the bare liberty of acting on their own principles. These, therefore, may in general be supposed to unite with ministry; together with all such as are expectants, either in behalf of themselves or others, and this may extend to very remote connections.— But for those of the second class, the landholders considered merely as such, I do apprehend both from what I see, and from the nature of the case, that they do not, in this step at least, unite with ministry; and certainly, nothing can be more diametrically opposite to their interest, than for them so to do. I believe however that some artifice hath been practised by ministry and their emissaries to allure them. The *ignis fatuus* which was sent forth to bewilder their senses, to weary them by a restless toil in a vain and imaginary pursuit, and at last to plunge them into inextricable difficulties,

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was nothing less than a pretended alleviation of the land-tax. Ministry well know where hardships are placed ; I would too that they were as sedulous to remove them. They generally know likewise the means of leading a multitude by imperceptible gradations, to defeat their own ends, and to work their own evil ; but in this instance their subtlety failed them. For we must not conclude, that if their representatives have joined the ministry, and have supported their measures, that in so doing they have acted conformably to the sentiments of their constituents, or that their constituents do adopt their sentiments. No, the case is far otherwise ; and they acted not upon the same plan, because perhaps they had different motives and inducements. Be this as it may, to induce the landed interest to promote the measures of ministry, it was suggested to them,—If you complain of the burthen of the land-tax, you have now before you the means of redress ; you must vigorously support ministry in opposition to America ; a revenue is to be raised from thence, and you will find relief ; it is true, the Americans will not approve of the measure, and they may remonstrate against it, but it will be to no purpose ; and as to resistance, that will either be impracticable, or if attempted as soon defeated ; and thus without further inconvenience or expence, you may assure yourselves
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of redress ; all that is required of you is to be strenuous on the part of ministry, and you may then consider the end as accomplished.

In terms like these were hopes given to the land-holders, who at first erected their crests, which had hitherto been depressed by the weight of taxes. But as soon as they came seriously to reflect on the nature of the cause they were to espouse, its impropriety, and the probable effects that would result from it, very few, if any, of those who could properly be stiled independent, gave it the least countenance ; and so far from supporting, abjured the measure. They could not but know and foresee, that the cause was desperate, to say no more of it, and in the end would be ruinous to them. This I know was declared at the time, long before violence had been perpetrated, or an army had been sent to America to enforce obedience ; but the emissaries and adherents of ministry affected to treat the notion with contempt, and as a mere emanation of the ignorance of its authors. How justly it was founded, the event and dear experience do now confirm, whilst ministry are getting together all the troops they can collect from every quarter, both domestic and foreign, to transport them to America ; and this last session of Parliament has without any the
least

least hesitation laid on them an additional shilling in the pound land-tax for a beginning, as an aid towards prosecuting this American war. And I think they may remain very well assured, be the war, of ever so short duration, successful or unsuccessful, they will never (without some greater effort than can be reasonably expected from the supineness of land-holders) see that shilling taken off again. So that from Lady-day, 1776, a land-tax of four shillings in the pound, at least, will be entailed upon them and their generations after them for ever. This is one of the blessings the land-holders are to derive from this American war, be its duration ever so short: but should it peradventure be of any continuance, I am persuaded so inattentive and inactive are they in whatever concerns their interest, and the taxation of their property, that even six shillings in the pound will hardly excuse them in future. And though I found this opinion on somewhat more than mere conjecture, I know the force of their incredulity, and expect in return for the caution here given that they will reprehend me, and rank me among the number of the dreamers of dreams. But whether I dream or not, confident I am that either they are not awake, or might as well have been asleep as far as concerns an interest important to them, and which they •

they seem now to neglect with the same indifference they have done for some years past, and with the carelessness of a worthless parent have totally abandoned to the will of unrelenting ministry. If they mean therefore to continue in this lethargic state, cankered and incrustated with supineness instead of taking an active and determined part in support and vindication of their property, they must not complain or regret if they become the insignificant dupes of a ministry; their property the legal spoil of a corrupted few; or if they have six shillings in the pound laid on their lands and houses to be wasted and consumed, or pretended to be so, in an American war, from which I do not see it possible for them to derive one single benefit.

What the emissaries of ministry gave out, That the landholders might obtain an alleviation of their land tax, and without expence, is false in the first instance; for the alleviation proposed has not happened, nor is it ever likely to happen; and the expence which was never to happen, is already arrived. Unless they consider the additional shilling in the pound already laid on as no expence to the land-holder. From that ease and facility with which it was proposed; that it was no sooner proposed than consented to; and that without hesitation it was the first tax upon this occasion thought of and concluded upon, are convincing proofs

proofs of the light estimation in which this tax is considered, and that the land-holders are held out by ministry in all cases as their devoted victims. Where will this end; and what in the course of time will be the consequence of such opinions accompanied with such adulatory compliance? Who can foresee where ministry will vouchsafe to draw the line, and in mercy to the landholder say, Thus far, is enough!

The proposition then is false in one instance; the expence: for one shilling in the pound land tax is now laid on. Let us next consider the probability of that other part; an alleviation in the land tax. And indeed, if the land-holders concurred in promoting this war, it could be with no other view than to find a relief from America in the land-tax. And as this tax has been laid on at different times by a shilling in the pound, (as some scruple not to affirm principally in the support and defence of America) they might therefore have reason to expect it would be taken off in like manner, by a relief afforded them from American taxation. This conclusion is natural; but if such was their expectation, (and I do not see they could have any other) they would be no less deceived in this second instance, than they were in the first. In a word, ministry had no such object in contemplation, nor indeed could they possibly have

have attained it ; this notion was given out to amuse, while ministry meant nothing more than to fight their own battles at the landholder's expence. For suppose, if you will, the Americans subdued, and brought to ministerial terms : What annual sum or revenue do ministry expect to raise on them? —I never heard a larger proposed than 300,000/. Let us suppose for a moment the whole of this sum could be raised ; and every shilling of it applied to ease the land-tax, which, by the way, is a circumstance altogether improbable, or rather impossible and impracticable ; however, in favour of the landed interest, let us a while suppose it. How much even in this most flattering instance would the land-holders be thereby relieved in their land-tax? I answer, not seven-pence farthing in the pound. One shilling in the pound land-tax raises 500,000/. according to which proportion 300,000/. is not so much as seven-pence farthing in the pound. If the land-holders therefore do concur in promoting this American war in expectation of relief, the least that can be said of them is, that they have rushed too precipitantly into the measure ; how inconsiderately, the least reflection will determine. The first advance they make costs them one shilling in the pound additional land-tax ; and how much more it may be attended with in future, I am certain they

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will

will not pretend to determine for themselves. If neither a reconciliation, nor a rejection takes place, and shortly too, it is very probable they will feel the weight of two shillings more in the pound, that is, they will pay six shillings in the pound land-tax before the conclusion of this war. So that by their mismanagement and imprudence, and precipitation, they have been instrumental in bringing upon themselves a certain considerable expence, together with the prospect of a much greater, for the bare *hopes* of acquiring a small, trifling and uncertain gain.—The expected gain itself is chimerical, improbable, and, I may say, impossible and unattainable; and were it not so, is altogether disproportionable and inadequate to the certain loss incurred by the attempt to acquire it.

Could the land-holders be deluded to so great a degree as to imagine that on a supposition 300,000*l.* could be annually raised from America, that the whole of this sum would be appropriated by ministry to give them relief in the land-tax! They must conceit themselves the great favourites of ministry indeed, to suggest that a war like this is undertaken solely on their account. That the security and prosperity of King and kingdom are both hazarded to give them the pitiful relief of seven-pence farthing in the pound land-tax. That no part of the revenue

venue raised in America shall be expended in benefit to that country on which it was raised. And lastly, they must entertain a strange opinion of ministry, through whose hands it is to pass, to surmise that it will be held so sacred that no part of it will be purloined from public use. Upon the whole then, suppose 300,000 *l.* to be raised; part of it judiciously appropriated, and part of it crumbled away, as usual, in the handling; I will venture to assert, what I believe no man will deny, that the remaining part, were it applied to mitigate the land-tax, would not afford the landed interest the poor relief of two-pence in the pound.

The land-holder moreover might know (from dear experience he has reason to know it) with what difficulty any the least alleviation is obtained in the land-tax; with what reluctance ministry suffer the least part of a land-tax to be remitted when once laid on; and that it is a tax increasing upon him to his beggary and ruin. Whoever reflects seriously on this, must be astonished to see him thrusting himself forward in this American contention, and imprecating taxes, as a thoughtless abandoned wretch doth curses, on himself and his posterity.

Whatever set of men in this kingdom may be benefited by war, it is indubitably the interest of the land-holders to promote peace. War doth ever burthen them with taxes,

without affording any substitute, or making them any compensation whatever. But a war like this with America is pregnant with ruin to all orders of men in the community, ministry and their dependants only excepted; who by this mean expect to have the plundering of both parties, and consequently have nothing less in contemplation than to enrich themselves by the spoil. Excelling in this respect the magistrates even of Rome, by whom *avarice and private rapine were at last added to political ambition. The Provinces were first oppressed and plundered. The calamity in process of time, reached Italy itself, and the centre of the Republic**. Thus these Magistrates went deliberately and gradually to work to feed their ambition and avarice; the Provinces first fell a sacrifice, then Italy, and lastly Rome itself; but ministry with us are not quite so indulgent; by one *coup de main* they attempt to execute their enterprize, and to involve Great Britain and America in the same calamity. In more instances than one† they seem to act on the principles of Cardinal Mazarin, of whom Lord Chester-

* De Lolme's Constitution of England, p. 342.

† " Mazarin trod in the steps of Richlieu; he met
 " with great opposition, but succeeded in the end. He
 " moreover stripped the Parliament of its prerogatives;
 " inasmuch that that Assembly is now but a shadow,
 which

Chesterfield in his 177th letter says, *I mean Ambition and Avarice: the latter is often the true cause of the former; and then is the predominant passion. It seems to have been so in Cardinal Mazarin; who did any thing, submitted to any thing, and forgave any thing for the sake of plunder. He loved and courted Power like an usurer; because it carried Profit along with it.*

But the independent landholders, of all men existing, can have no prospect of advantage either direct or indirect, present or remote, in prosecuting this war: and therefore I cannot be induced to believe they ever promoted it. For if we do not subdue America, what a fruitless waste of their property! And if we suppose it subdued, what benefit can accrue to them, or any others, by the possession of a country laid waste;

“ which still, at times, will fancy itself to be a body, but it is generally made to repent of its error.” Le Cardinal Mazarin marcha sur les traces de Richelieu: il essuia beaucoup d’oppositions; mais il y réussit. Il dépouilla de plus le Parlement des ses prérogatives; de sorte que cette Compagnie n’est aujourd’hui qu’un fantôme, à qui il arrive encore quelque fois de s’imaginer qu’il pourroit bien être un Corps, mais qu’on faire ordinairement repentir de cette erreur. *Anti-Mach.* ch. 3, p. 35.

And Lord Chesterfield says, “ Richlieu came and shackled the nation, and Mazarin and Louis 14th rivetted the shackles.” Letter 234.

its people destroyed; and its towns in ashes! If the inhabitants are not all to be cut off, both they and their descendants will ever remain impatient under the yoke which is intended by this war to be put upon them. Lord Bolingbroke speaks pertinently to the present case; *The freedom of a constitution rests on two points, The orders of it are one: so Machiavel calls them, and I know not how to call them more significantly. He means not only the forms and customs, but the different classes and assemblies of men, with different powers and privileges attributed to them, which are established in the state. The spirit and character of the people are the other. On the mutual conformity and harmony of these the preservation of liberty depends. To take away, or essentially to alter the former, cannot be brought to pass, whilst the latter remains in original purity and vigour; nor can liberty be destroyed by this method, unless the attempt be made with a military force sufficient to conquer the nation, which would not submit in this case till it was conquered, nor with much security to the conqueror even then**. As this would in all probability be the case supposing America to be subjected, unless it be intended to extirpate the inhabitants, (which Heaven forbid!) therefore, to keep and continue them in sub-

* Lord Bolingbroke's Patriot King, p. 120.

jection,

jection, garrisons must be formed throughout that extensive empire, and that army supported at the expence of Great Britain; in which case, will not the land-holders be obliged to contribute their share towards this new created expence? For as to America, after the devastation of war it would not be able to support itself. And depopulated by two powerful causes, the one the sword, the other the flight of its inhabitants into the back settlements, the mountains, remote and almost impervious and inaccessible parts, what will remain of this once populous and flourishing colony? If it be to revive, and become once more a colony, it must for this purpose be nursed anew, and this will employ the course of many years, and much treasure must be expended before it will arrive at any tolerable degree of strength and maturity. The treasures necessary for this purpose must come from Great Britain; if from Great Britain, will the land-holders be overlooked when these subsidies are raised?

If I have dwelt longer than was proposed on the impropriety of the land-holders promoting this war, it has been with a view to remove what I conceive to be a prejudice taken up against them, by setting forth the improbability of the fact from the obvious consequences attending such a measure, all which are evidently contrary to his interests
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in particular. Nor can I see that the nation in general can be benefited by this war, not even on the supposition that we become victorious. On the contrary, let us subdue, or be subdued, on either hand, which ever way we turn, if this war continues, there is nothing but distress marked out for us. We are reduced to that situation which makes the very hope of victory and conquest dreadful. Success is to be lamented; and we may lament that there is no probability of success. For this can be the result only, in our case, of the superior wisdom of our Councils over those of the Americans, since in most other particulars of importance they have certainly the advantage over us. The *superior wisdom* of our councils is then to decide; and as this point is of so much consequence, I shall be excused if instead of reposing an implicit confidence in what is advanced by others* on this subject, I should proceed to a concise investigation from past events;

* Dean Tucker, in his Address to the Landed Interest, p. 8, says, " For I think it may be fairly allowed, " without paying them (the pretent set of ministers) any " compliment, that they are to the full as *able* and as *honest* " as the best of those who endeavour to supplant them." This is a very courtly insinuation, for it neither proves, nor even asserts any thing to the purpose: they may be as able and as honest as the best of those who are endeavouring to supplant them, and yet, perhaps, have no claim either

events ; which will tend more to establish it on its proper footing, and to be decisive of what we are to expect from it, than all the frothy and complimentary adulation of a thousand tongues.

It is well known, for we are now feeling the effects of it, that the views and manœuvres of ministry had convinced all America at least, that they were directly levelled against the liberties of that people ; this raised the general discontent and indignation of the inhabitants throughout that continent. At length the minds of the people were not only universally inflamed, but their hands were ready to take up arms. Under the in-

either to honesty, or ability in their profession. This compliment is of that kind which defeats its own aim, and destroys that which it was intended to establish. What the people require at this time, is to have men in the administration of public affairs, who are both able and honest in an eminent degree, let them come from what quarter they will. This, I say, is required at this time by the public, and the public do *require* it, because, I presume, they have a right to *demand* it. And that such men are to be found, no one can doubt, if faction, party, and favouritism, the bane of civil government, were set aside. A King of England may at all times have an able and honest ministry in spite of any opposition or faction ; and the People who would derive prosperity from such an administration, would cheerfully support them in office, when once appointed. But the People cannot appoint, though they may support : and therefore, if they are not appointed for them, they can never have them.

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fluence of this notion, just, or unjust, (which shall be further discussed in the sequel) we are not to be surpris'd at the effect as containing any thing the least extraordinary; all men may know it is too late to contend for liberty, when the shackles are once rivetted on; and a sensible political author delivers it as a precept, that "It is both just and merciful
 " to take up arms in defence of liberty,
 " when all other means, hopes, and re-
 " sources fail;" *Qui è giustizia grande, per-
 che quella guerra è giusta che gli è necessaria, e
 quelle armi sono pietose dove non si spera in altro,
 che in elle.** Here we must pause to observe
 where the wisdom of ministry exerted itself.
 Was it wisdom to raise such a ferment?
 when unhappily raised, where was the wis-
 dom in not finding some expedient to allay
 it? Or was it the better wisdom to suffer it
 to take its course, and to acquire that
 strength in which we now behold it?

At this time, ministry were not ignorant of the state of America, for the common news-papers furnished us all with that knowledge: yet such was their wisdom, that they suffered themselves to be amused with an idle tale, nay to give implicit faith to it, though there was not a man of under-

* Machiavelli. cap. 26.

standing and experience in the kingdom who could swallow so palpable an absurdity, That an army of five thousand regulars would march unimpeded from one end of America to the other, and subject that whole continent without difficulty, to the will of ministry. They were led to believe that with such a force all was to be completed in Cæsar's gallant and expeditious manner, *Veni, vidi, vici*. These forces were accordingly sent; which, not attempting to land in any hostile manner, were permitted to come on shore, without obstruction. Had force been used, so far from kicking all America before them, it is probable not one man would have marched an hundred paces upon that continent. A simulated pacific disposition, accompanied with a restraint from hostilities having secured their landing; they were received into Boston with lukewarmness. Their general no sooner turned himself round, than he evidently perceived ministry had been made the dupes of their own creatures. He applied for a reinforcement; not to act offensively, for that he saw was impossible; but least matters should become more desperate, he might be able to act defensively: not to push on the war against the Americans with such a force, and with which he might as rationally have attempted to push America into Europe; but by this conjoined force to be able to
find

find safety within the fortifications of Boston which he was now erecting in the strongest manner. He applied for a reinforcement; it was sent him: and his army being increased to almost treble the number at first proposed, instead of acting offensively, was employed in fortifying Boston by every means art could devise, lest they should be there attacked, and cut off to a man by a small part only of the whole of the American forces.

Thus was this army, (one half part only of which ministry were imposed on to believe would conquer all America by the terrors of its appearance) I say even this whole army was cooped up, hardly daring to look beyond the *pemocrum* of Boston for the greater part of the summer; living upon a scanty allowance of salt provisions; distressed by sickness from their confinement and diet, which increasing, swept them off like a pestilential disease, and they dropt as fast as leaves from the trees in the latter part of autumn: and within those fortifications they would probably have remained to this hour, had not immediate self-preservation rendered it necessary for them to dislodge a party of the American troops which had taken possession of Bunker's Hill, and were absolutely preparing to bombard the town. Thus ended this glorious campaign, which was planned by the wisdom of ministry, in the
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acquisition of about one acre and a half of ground gained at the expence of twelve hundred men, who were either killed on the spot, or whose maims have rendered them unfit for further service; with the loss of about two thousand more who have perished by disease in Boston, or by accidents of various kinds in going to it; or have been worse than lost, by desertion to the enemy; whose example, if I am rightly informed, would have been followed by very great numbers, had not their situation made it too difficult, and had they not been as carefully watched as the Americans themselves.

A well-concerted plan, activity, and a formidable stroke given in the commencement of a war are generally the prelude of victory and conquest. Wisdom dictates the measure, and leaves the execution and event to skill, fortitude, and courage; but this opportunity once neglected is lost for ever. Ministry had this opportunity in their power, but it is now no more. America no doubt was vulnerable, but I think she is so no longer. It was the part of the wisdom of ministry to have penetrated this secret before hostile measures were concluded upon; and not first to determine upon hostile measures, and then to be at a loss for the means of executing them. Yet this is that wisdom which has been so much applauded in late addresses, and it is this wisdom which has brought the
army

army at Boston into almost incredible difficulties, to say no worse; and this wisdom must in the end, if persisted in, bring this nation much sooner to ruin, than America into subjection. Upon the very face of things this wisdom committed two capital, dangerous, and unpardonable errors. The first was, to be so ignorant of the state of America with respect to the temper, resentment, courage, and unanimity of the inhabitants and of the armed troops that could on an emergency be raised on that continent to oppose the measures of ministry. Had these circumstances been known in any tolerable degree, one would imagine frenzy itself would not have sent that army to Boston, which, before it had surrounded itself with fortifications, was more indebted for its safety to the clemency of the Americans, or at least a reluctance in them to proceed to extremities, than to any judicious destination allotted to it by ministry. An aversion in the Americans to shed the blood of their innocent fellow subjects till urged and prompted thereto by self-preservation and absolute necessity was at that hour the only security of that army; for had the Americans been bent on destruction, had they been by nature sanguinary and savage as they have been falsely represented, they might with ease have led to Boston before the fortifications had been erected, such a
part

part of their troops as would have sacrificed every man in that army to the wisdom of the ministry which had sent them: This was the first error; and the second was like unto it; unpardonable, because it was erring contrary to known rules, maxims, and precepts. I mean, the error of sending an army into a country where not only the disposition of the inhabitants were not favourable to it, but even where the treatment of ministry had rendered the people inimical and hostile; and what is more, without having one neighbouring province to countenance, to assist, and to support them: in a word, without a single province on that whole continent having declared in their favour. Were these men inclined to improve by experience, the affair at St. Cas in the last war, might have taught them the folly and weakness of such expeditions, which can serve no other purpose than to sacrifice the unhappy troops who are sent upon them. And the late slaughter of the Spanish troops on the coast of Barbary, affords another recent proof of the futility of these adventures. Or could precept avail, it is laid down in express terms by Machiaval, that, "However powerful your army may be, it is necessary to obtain the favour of the inhabitants before you march into their country; *Perche sempre ancora che uno sia fortissimo in sù gli essercitti, ha bisogna ancora*

ancora del favore de' Provinciali ad entrar in una provincia *. The precept is just; the reasons are obvious to every man of the least reflection; the preceding miscarriages, with many more were we to look further back into past occurrences, justify it: and because ministry were unacquainted with, forgot, or contemned both the examples and precept, our army has experienced at least some, though (thanks be to the humanity of the Americans!) not all the inconveniencies, or rather calamities arising from this neglect or contempt, both with respect to their enemies without, and the fatal sickness and almost absolute famine they suffered within the walls of Boston. And much more fatal had been this expedition, if the Americans had brought down a part of their forces, and had attacked our troops immediately upon their landing. Nor can it be imputed to the wisdom of ministry, but to a reluctance in the Americans to imbrue their hands in blood, that this was not effected.

Where then are we to look for this applauded wisdom of ministry? Has it manifested itself by a knowledge of that part of America which was vulnerable? and therefore an army was sent to Boston where it could not act; to be ruined by

* Machiavelli, cap. 3.

sickness and desertion; or to be cut in pieces by the Americans, if they ventured beyond the protection of the fleet, and their fortifications.—Has it consisted in a knowledge of the strength of the Provincials, who have an army of seventy or eighty thousand men well disciplined, and who could raise on an emergency double that number? and therefore an army of twelve thousand men only have been sent against them, and that at different periods?—Has it displayed itself in the knowledge of the military prowess of this people? or was that left to be decided at Lexington and Bunker's-Hill?—Has it extended only so far as to know what genius the Americans possessed for war, or to form an idea of their power and abilities? or was that left to be determined when a small part only of their forces should block up an army in Boston, one half of which it was imagined would subdue all America?—Or doth it consist in the knowledge of the force of American resentment, as descendants of Britons, when founded on principles of honour and justice, for supposed contempt, insults, and injuries received? of which they have at length given some evident and satisfactory proof.—Or lastly, has it distinguished itself in sending an army to Boston not only previous to a declaration of the inhabitants in its favour, but without having friends in the province whither it was sent; without

having secured a contiguous province in its favour; or indeed any one province upon that continent? by means whereof that army has been hemmed in, and in a manner destroyed by sickness and famine; in perpetual danger from the enemy; and inactive in every thing beyond self-preservation. If these be the characteristics of wisdom, it can be only of that kind which must undo us. In all ministry have done, I profess to discover nothing superior to a long train of glaring and enormous inconsistencies, such as would degrade common sense to adopt them; and to endeavour to give them the colouring of good policy or wisdom, would be offering a mockery and violence to the understandings of mankind. Every man must see, that throughout this whole undertaking they have been weak, wavering, fickle, uncertain, indeterminate; limping between resolution and timidity, temerity and despondency, perseverance and despair, justice and injustice, emolument and conscience; one while fluctuating on this side, then on the other, touching at times each of the extremes, and fixing no where. Thus has this war from want of knowledge, or by design been protracted, by which, a burthen of taxes and other misfortunes are come upon us, and more are rushing on apace. At length, as a man suddenly roused from his sleep, starts up, and before he is well awake,

catches

catches fast hold on whatever is near him, he knows not what ; so ministry determine on a plan the most improper for them to conduct, if we may be allowed to judge from the abilities they have hitherto displayed. And we are now to go blundering on through this American business sword in hand,

Omne sacrum rapiente dextra.

And it may be presumed they are no better acquainted with the face of that country into which their armies are now to march, than they were before with the genius and disposition of the Americans. On all sides every thing is hostile, and they will have to encounter with troops at least equal to themselves in point of courage and discipline, unless it can be supposed that an army consisting indeed of some few good British troops, the rest raw undisciplined levies, German troops, and ragamuffin German vagrants, the dregs of a wretched country, picked up in every quarter of it, and enlisting for a subsistence, are superior to an army of British descendants contending in the cause of liberty and whatever beside is dear to mankind. From a patched up motly army like this, what is to be expected? Will any man be surprised, if on the first opportunity after their landing, one half of these mercenaries should desert to the enemy, when our own troops, from an

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aversion,

aversion, I suppose, to the cause, have already set them the example; and when this may be effected with more facility in marching into a country, than when confined by narrow fortifications where nothing almost can pass unnoticed. There are many causes to induce these mercenary troops to desert, and what if the Americans should declare that wherever they met them in arms they would give them no quarter, as having no right to be there because they cannot be interested in the dispute; that they come there as robbers and murderers, and ought to be considered and treated as such: but on the contrary, if they will join them against their opponents they will give them suitable encouragement; or if they will decline the profession of war, and come over, they shall be provided with a retirement in their back settlements. I say, it can hardly be supposed when such offers are made, and no doubt they will be made, that these foreigners should reject them. Most men would prefer agriculture, and the employments attending a rural life, with peace and safety, if they could support themselves in that way of life, to warfare, attended by constant hardships, perpetual insecurity, and frequently death itself. And when they know that the American army is far superior in number, and at least as determined as their own, and that of course each individual

dividual of them will be more frequently called upon duty, and consequently the oftener exposed to danger, a consideration which will ever weigh with mercenary troops, it would be extraordinary indeed, if by desertion they did not provide for their own safety.

As to numbers, the American army will be greatly superior to ours. And Lord Chesterfield, though no general, yet may be supposed to have been able to form a tolerable judgment of the matter from history, reason, and experience; he says, * *In war, numbers are generally my omens.* And it is well known a great † French general was so confident in this opinion, that it carried him even to an excess of impiety; if he had but the advantage of numbers, he defied every thing. Certain it is, that an army inferior in number, is not an army proper for offence; it may support itself for some time on the defensive from the favourable situation of the country in which it is to act, or from some accidental advantages; and if at the close of the campaign it is not made to retreat from the country it was sent to defend

* Letter, 316th.

† He was so confident of this advantage, that he is reported to have said "Give me but the numbers, and ~~G~~ may take which side he will."

and cover, it may be said to have effected all that could be reasonably expected from it. But our army, though inferior in number is sent to take possession, to conquer, to subdue. In order to do this they must march forward, in a country where every thing around is hostile. They have further to contend with a people who have hearts to conceive, heads to contrive, and hands to execute, equal to any set of men, the business they have undertaken. If our army should be once or twice defeated, (and defeated it may be, I see no reason why it should not,) what is to become of the scattered remnant? what refuge? what retreat? There are no fortified towns to receive, or cover them. A communication with the fleet, if they are to march inland, will be cut off, and its protection intercepted. In such case, will not the foreign troops, if they have not before deserted, join the enemy in preference to being made prisoners of war and put under confinement, or to being cut to pieces? And if our army is not to march inland, how is it to conquer? for roaming about on the coast of America under protection of the fleet will never subdue America; it may protract the war, but will never bring it to a conclusion.

What if our army formed of mixed troops should disagree among themselves, a circumstance by no means improbable; and the
British

British troops should be for pushing on to battle, and the Germans not interested in the event, decline coming to an engagement. If I can trust to memory, something of this kind happened more than once in the civil wars of France, where the German troops were employed, and not without inconveniencies. German troops may join a British army in Germany, and harmony may subsist between them, and they may act in concert to repel a French army advancing into their country, and against whom there is a national antipathy; but it doth not follow that the same harmony should take place when they join the British troops on American ground, and against the Americans for whom they can have conceived no hatred, in a cause in which they are not interested, and where the justice and equity of their drawing the sword may excite the idea of self-conscious criminality.

But wherefore should I waste time in pointing out some of those causes which will most probably conduce to make this war as unsuccessful and calamitous in the conclusion, as it is ill-judged, dangerous and burthen some in the beginning. Can we require any further conviction of this when we are assured that the same counsels, the same administration which forced us into this war, and which planned the former campaign, are the authors likewise of the present;
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whose wisdom is such, that though it can afford nothing to hope for, yet it gives us every thing to fear. I have given many reasons, which if not separately, yet taken together, appear to me conclusive against undertaking this war, though it were assumed even by the ablest of administrations; and if all others failed there is one particular which alone should have deterred us from it, I mean THE JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE; and this shall now be enquired into.

The Parliament of Great Britain claim the right and power of legislation and taxation over the Americans in all cases whatsoever: and the non-compliance on the part of the American with this right and power being so vested in the Parliament of Great Britain, is the cause of the present American war.

Now it is altogether consonant to the Constitution of England at this day, and it is moreover an indubitable fact, that there cannot be a free Government, or in other words, the subjects cannot be a free People under any Government.

First, Where the People do not make laws for themselves; or are subject to any laws but those of their own making.

Secondly, Where the People do not tax themselves; or are subject to any taxation but that which they have consented to, or have imposed on themselves.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Where the People are not their own judges in all causes both civil and criminal.

These three powers resting in the hands of the people are the counterbalance to the whole of the Executive Power vested in a single Person. On this equilibrium of Power, the liberty of the subject, and the safety of the constitution entirely depend. If any part of the Executive Power were placed in the hands of the Subject the balance would be unequal, Power would preponderate on the side of the people, confusion would ensue, and the constitution go to wreck. And if any of those three Powers were to be vested elsewhere than in the People, the Liberty of the subject would be immediately at an end.

If, therefore, the Parliament of Great Britain do exercise the power of legislation, and of taxation over the Americans; or in other words, If the Americans do not make laws for themselves, and do not tax themselves, but are to be subject to have laws made for them by others, and to have taxation imposed on them by others; then the Americans are not a free people.

If Great Britain, therefore, doth make war against the Americans, because they will not submit to, and acknowledge the powers of legislation and taxation over them to be vested in the Parliament of Great Britain; Great Britain doth then make war
against

against the Americans, because they will not resign their Liberty into their hands.

And, if Great Britain doth make war against the Americans because they will not resign their Liberty; then Great Britain doth make war against the Americans because they will not consent to become her slaves.

There cannot be, in my conception, a fairer deduction than this; and it proves to a demonstration that the cause of the present war is, *That the Americans will not consent to become Slaves.* Let every man therefore who lives in a Land of Freedom, who knows and enjoys so invaluable a blessing as Liberty, and who has sentiments to enable him to feel for the deprivation of it in others, be judge of the JUSTICE of our cause in this American war. And as we cannot be so insincere and hypocritical as to implore the favour of Heaven on this undertaking, sanguinary as it is, but in proportion to the Justice on which it is founded; what right have we to imagine that Heaven will not turn the event of it against us to our ruin, by displaying its mercy and favour to that cause which is founded in Justice, and to those who contend only to secure to themselves the natural, just, and indisputable rights and priviledges of mankind; and which, their fellow subjects in Great Britain and Ireland do enjoy?

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Upon the whole therefore, the prosecution of this war cannot be approved, because it is evidently founded in injustice ; and because the happiness or misery on the one hand and on the other the lives of so many thousands of our fellow subjects depend upon its issue. No political reasons, let them be what they may, let them be ever so effectual to disguise, to colour, or even to justify actions and proceedings, considered in another light as wholly unjustifiable, can however give a sanction to a war undertaken by us with a view to deprive another part of our fellow subjects of that liberty which they have a right to enjoy in common with ourselves, and to reduce them from the state of fellow subjects and fellow participants in Freedom, to the abject condition of coming our Slaves. The adoption of any other measure, provided it be founded in justice, is preferable to this: rather let our ambitious desire for wide extended dominion (*ever attended with disorder and bad

ministers

* History, no where that I know of, furnishes us with an account of any enormous Empire that was ever governed : nor do I know of one at this day that is. The extremities of such empires are too far removed from the heart of government to admit its vital vigour to flow in them with that velocity which is necessary to constitute good government. The ordinances, which are strictly complied with in provinces near the seat of government,

ministration of government throughout the universe) fall a sacrifice to justice; and if the Americans are ungrateful let them be cast off for their ingratitude, but let us not imbrue our hands in their blood, and at the expence of the lives of so many of our countrymen unjustly attempt to rivet upon them the shackles of slavery. And if they
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ment, become in a measure torpid before they reach the remote provinces of an enormous empire; and moreover these provinces are generally consigned to the care of deputies, who, generally, the further they are removed from the seat of Empire, proportionably neglect the duties of their office; and it is well if the mischief ends here, and that they do not consider themselves as lawful tyrants, and such provinces as legal plunder; this, in time, especially when carried to excess, is the cause of insurrections, revolutions, and every evil that can disgrace or injure government. If evils like these are almost inseparable from enormous Empire, even where there is a continuity of territory, what may not be expected from such, whose remote provinces, which make beyond all comparison the greatest territorial part of the empire, are intercepted by an ocean of three thousand miles? Men may flatter themselves with what notions they please on this matter; but I am persuaded so enormous a territory as America, so far removed from the seat of Government, and fountain of justice, can never be well governed otherwise than by a legislation of its own; nor will it submit to be governed in any other manner (however by violence it may be reduced to it for the present) one moment longer than that people are under the necessity of submitting to such kind of government; nothing can be more natural than to conclude, that as soon as they become sufficiently powerful by increasing numbers, they will certainly emancipate themselves from such a situation.

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are not ungrateful, let a reconciliation be planned on principles of justice and liberty, by restoring to them their councils and assemblies with the powers that have been inseparably annexed to them from their first foundation; in a word, let their own proper Governments be restored and established, If there be inconveniencies attendant upon either

The Romans, who were conscious of this ill consequence, endeavoured to anticipate it by removing from time to time the youth of such provinces into their armies, where being slain in battle there was an end of them, and a constant demand for more; by which mean those who would prove refractory and were capable of doing the most execution being thus out of the way, the rest remained tolerably quiet where the oppression of governors were not too severe to be borne. This incorporating the provincial youth in their armies might answer to a martial Nation which subsisted by war; but can never be practised by Great Britain whose fort is commerce. We must have recourse to another expedient if we mean to secure the Americans in peaceful obedience; and satisfied I am none other can be devised to make it firm, stable, and perpetual, than to place the Powers of legislation, taxation, and judging, in the hands of the People, while the executive power, at least a great part of it, is entrusted to deputies appointed by the Crown. Thus might a perfect good Government be established; and as all cause on the part of the People for emancipating themselves from Government would cease, consequently all desire of doing so would be at an end. America would no doubt by this mean become prosperous; how far it might think itself under the necessity of contributing towards the luxury and excesses of another state I will not pretend to answer for. But this I will venture to assert, that no other mode of Government than that which is here pointed

either of these measures, they are not of that nature to be held in competition with the guilt which results from supporting by war a cause founded in injustice, supported by murder, and promoted by desolation of every kind; in the progress of which, humanity shudders; reason is mocked to scorn; and Justice recedes from us at every step we make.

pointed out will answer any other purpose than temporising, and will be found ineffectual to continue the Americans any longer in subjection when that period arrives in which they will be enabled to throw off the yoke. Such a Government can be beneficial neither to the governing nor the governed party; yet we are labouring through every thing just and unjust, and at all hazards, to establish it, and to wait the event, though without any difficulty we might reject them; or with as little difficulty establish among them a good, perfect, peaceful, and permanent Government if we pleased; as permanent, as the nature of enormous extent of Empire can admit of.

E N D.



